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CORPORATE LAW FIRMS, NGOS, AND ISSUES
OF LEGITIMACY FOR A GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER
Yves Dezalay* & Bryant G. Garth**
INTRODUCTION
The dream of legal globalization was well stated by then-Secretary of
State Warren Christopher in his 1995 article in Foreign Policy. 1 Explicitly
drawing on the legacy of the elite corporate lawyers identified with the U.S.
foreign policy establishment, 2 he characterized the Clinton
Administration’s foreign policy as follows: “We have put in place the
building blocks of a more prosperous, more secure, more democratic world
that will serve our national interests well into the twenty-first century.” 3
Enumerating achievements and outlining an agenda for the future,
Christopher called for the strengthening and elaboration of institutional
structures that aspire to entrench the norms of free trade and democracy:
“These institutions have set and enforced rules of conduct among an
increasing number of nations. . . . They have given structure, legitimacy,
and strength to the common enterprise of Western democracies: avoiding
war and promoting global economic growth.” 4
Christopher’s perspective connected the legal structures designed to
entrench the rules for global trade and investment to the role of law in
protecting democracy and human rights. The legitimacy of the new global
order, he believed, depended on success on both sides of global law. 5 But
the dynamics of world politics have changed considerably since Christopher
posited his views in 1995. The War on Terror and the global recession have
shaken the faith in an emerging global rule of law.6 The emergence of
China as a huge economic power has raised the question whether it is a

* Director Emeritus of the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.
** Professor and Dean of Southwestern Law School and Director Emeritus of the American
Bar Foundation.
1. See generally Warren Christopher, America’s Leadership, America’s Opportunity,
98 FOREIGN POL’Y 6 (1995).
2. See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers, and Empire, in 3
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER
(1920– ) 718, 722–30 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) [hereinafter
LAW IN AMERICA].
3. Christopher, supra note 1, at 7.
4. Id. at 13.
5. Id.
6. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND
BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S
ILLEGAL WAR (2005).

2309

2310

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

“threat to the west or model for the rest,” as Randall Peerenboom states.7
But the various projects of legalization continue apace in most parts of the
world, including within China.8 There is no inevitability to this U.S. global
aspiration, but there continues to be growth in the role of law and lawyers in
global governance. 9
The proliferation of U.S.-style corporate law firms is one welldocumented feature of legal globalization. As Carole Silver’s research
shows, from 1988 to 2008, the number of overseas offices supported by the
National Law Journal’s list of the 250 largest U.S. firms nearly quadrupled,
and the number of lawyers working in these overseas offices increased by a
factor of twelve. 10 Despite the increasing prevalence of U.S. law degrees,
two-thirds of the lawyers in the overseas offices were educated exclusively
outside the United States. 11 The large multinational law firms based in the
United States have assimilated local connections and talent to go with U.S.
and global expertise. 12 The Magic Circle of British solicitors’ firms, as
well as firms from Australia and elsewhere, are also aggressively pursuing
the global-local path with considerable success. 13
Additionally, a number of local firms of varying sizes can be counted
among the globally oriented corporate firms. They often act as a modernday version of the compradors, who historically served as brokers for the
colonial ventures of dominant Western states. 14 Like the compradors of an
earlier era, these local firms have learned to speak two legal and cultural
languages—one oriented internationally and one locally. 15 The local
7. This language is borrowed from RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES:
THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? (2007).
8. See THOMAS LUM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22663, U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
IN CHINA 5–6 (2011) (discussing China).
9. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL REVIVALS:
LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE (2010); David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the
New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000). A recent book by DAVID C.
KANG, EAST ASIA BEFORE THE WEST: FIVE CENTURIES OF TRADE AND TRIBUTE (2010),
makes the point that the social, cultural, and political hegemony of China in the earlier
period has not been replicated despite China’s recent global ascendency. See id. at 169.
10. Carole Silver, The Variable Value of U.S. Legal Education in the Global Legal
Services Market, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1–2 (2011).
11. See id. at 16.
12. See id.
13. See Caroline Binham, Beyond the Magic Circle, FIN. TIMES (June 29, 2011, 10:27
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cf1fbf90-a278-11e0-9760-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1Uknd
KLeS. The American Lawyer’s Global 100 lists Magic Circle firms as two of the top four
and four of the top seven in gross revenue for the 2009 fiscal year. Magic Circle firms made
up four of the top eight in fiscal year 2010 gross revenue. Five Australian firms were in the
top 100 in both fiscal years 2009 and 2010. See The Am Law Global 100, AM. LAW.,
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202514393371 (last visited Apr. 21,
2012) (listing Magic Circle firms Clifford Chance, Linklaters, Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer, Allen and Overy, and Slaughter and May, and Australian firms Minter Ellison,
Mallesons Stephen Jacques, Allens Arthur Robinson, Freehills, and Clayton Utz).
14. See Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring: International and Local Law
Firms in China’s Corporate Law Market, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 778–80 (2008).
15. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
284–88 (1996).
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relationship varies considerably for these double agents, who are situated
between global corporate law and local structures of power.16 In the
extreme case, as occurred in the past in a number of colonial outposts such
as late nineteenth-century Shanghai, 17 foreign and foreign-oriented ventures
are confined to a limited geographic or economic sphere.18 The local
impact from international influence is then relatively limited. In other
cases, the lawyers serving international business interests may use
transnational connections to build their political and economic position
within local structures of state power.
These lawyers can even play the role of modernizers, armed with the
expertise and credibility that comes from connections with foreign trade and
investment. In these cases, the lawyers import the transnational legal
expertise, and deploy (and transform) it in local contexts. 19 They may bring
New York, British, and French contract law, the practices of international
commercial arbitration, rules governing trade stemming from the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and its decisions, corporate governance rules
connected to global finance, anti-corruption practices, and much more.20
Ultimately, they may facilitate the importation of sets of transnational rules
and practices, and promoters of globalization and the rule of law indeed
aspire to this “modernizing” result.
The well-documented spread of corporate law firms globally and
nationally is paralleled by a rise in the number of legally oriented Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) also operating at all levels. 21 NGOs
now occupy a wide variety of positions locally and at the transnational
level. 22 A number are opposed to, or seek to moderate, the neo-liberal
16. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 19–20.
17. See id. at 35–37. See generally Tahirih V. Lee, Risky Business: Courts, Culture, and
the Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1335 (1993) (describing the evolution of the “mixed
court” based in a foreign enclave in Shanghai).
18. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 35–37.
19. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN
STATES (2002) (examining the import and export of technologies of governance from the
North to Latin America).
20. See id. at 198–219.
21. On the globalization of public interest law, see generally Scott L. Cummings and
Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest Law, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1
(2008); Fabio de Sa e Silva, The World of Public Interest: Law and Globalization in the
Everyday Lives of Advocates (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. research project, Northeastern
University School of Law) (on file with author).
22. Reportedly, “the number of known international NGOs increased from about 13,000
in 1981 to over 47,000 by 2001.” Shepard Forman & Derk Segaar, New Coalitions for
Global Governance:
The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism, in 12 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 205, 214 (2006). The World Bank estimates that the number of World Bank
projects led by NGOs, as opposed to governmental organizations, increased from an average
of 28 percent in 1987–96, to 50 percent in 1998. WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1999, at
139 (1999), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent
Server/WDSP/IB/2000/06/13/000094946_99101505321247/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
See generally GLOBALIZATION, PHILANTHROPY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY:
PROJECTING
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS ABROAD (David C. Hammack & Steven Heydemann eds., 2009)
(showing how philanthropic efforts from the United States project U.S. approaches and
therefore seek to enhance “civil society” abroad); RESTRUCTURING WORLD POLITICS:
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policies associated with globalization—such as free trade, privatization, free
movement of capital—in favor of indigenous rights and environmental
protection, for example. The World Social Forum has brought together
many of these groups. 23 Numerous NGOs are conduits for projects funded
by the World Bank and national development agencies. 24 Those employing
law and lawyers tend to be among the more elite and better funded NGOs.25
Prominent philanthropic foundations, such as the Asia Foundation and the
Ford Foundation, and development agencies, such as the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and
many others, also continue to invest heavily in legally oriented NGOs and
the idea of “legal empowerment.” 26 Considerable investment, for example,
is going from the Ford Foundation to legal aid and to civil and criminal
justice reform in China. 27
There is a body of prescriptive literature that sees these proliferating legal
organizations—law firms and NGOs—as tools for the spread of liberal
democracy and the rule of law. 28 The literature is consistent with a
longstanding belief of the liberal establishment in the United States that free
trade, open doors to foreign investment, the rule of law, and democracy all
go hand in hand. 29 This approach took shape notably in the Philippines
after the Spanish-American War at the turn of the twentieth century. 30 The
Philippines became the model, training ground, and to some extent, the
showplace for this kind of desired evolution. 31 Warren Christopher
descended from this tradition. 32
The community of rule-of-law supporters operates as if law is a form of
contagion that can spread from any number of bases. As Matthew
Stephenson wrote, focusing on China, one way to see this is that reform in
one area represents a “Trojan horse” for the legalization of the state and the
TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeev Khagram et al. eds.,
2002) (tracing the rise and impact of NGOs as transnational advocacy groups).
23. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social
Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 29, 44–46 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos &
César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
24. See WORLD BANK, supra note 22, at 139.
25. See de Sousa Santos, supra note 23, at 56.
26. JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE
POOR: FROM CONCEPTS TO ASSESSMENT (2007).
27. See Grant Search Results, FORD FOUND., http://www.fordfoundation.org/Grants/
Search?searchphrase=law (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
28. See, e.g., Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal Empowerment
Alternative (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Rule of Law Series, Working Paper No. 41
2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf; David B. Wilkins, Globalization,
Lawyers and the Rule of Law: Private Practice and Public Values in the Global Market for
Corporate Legal Services (June 21, 2011), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
plp/pdf/Globalization_Lawyers_Rule_of_Law.pdf (remarks at the World Justice Forum).
29. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 57–61; EMILY ROSENBERG, SPREADING THE
AMERICAN DREAM: AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EXPANSION 1890–1945 (Eric
Foner ed., 1982).
30. See ROSENBERG, supra note 29, at 51–57.
31. See id.
32. See Christopher, supra note 1, at 7–8.
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economy more generally. 33 Many observers hope, for example, that reform
in the area of commercial law will lead to more recognition of individual
civil rights. 34 Similarly, they hope that reform in the method of legal
instruction, or the development of legal clinics, will teach critical thinking
that will lead to more leadership by law graduates in expanding the role of
law and lawyers. 35 Or, as mentioned above, they look to the rise of
corporate law firms as a means to expand legal opportunities for individuals
and build the autonomy of the courts. 36 With respect to China, for example,
the creation of legal aid organizations, membership in the WTO, the rise of
corporate law, and the reform of legal education to create a more U.S.-style
of teaching 37 have all been hailed at various times as bases to bring the rule
of law to China’s economy and government. 38 There is particular attention,
as we suggested in our introduction, to the role of corporate law firms on
one side and legally oriented NGOs on the other. 39
We frame this issue of spillover in a somewhat different manner than the
literature on corporate law firms, legal educational reform, legal NGOs, or
legal aid. 40 Our sociological approach to spillover focuses on institutions
that facilitate or accelerate spillover processes by providing mechanisms for
circulation (and conversion) of legal capital. Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu
here, as in our other studies, 41 we employ the concept of a field—for the
present study, the legal field. We use the concept of the field to describe
semi-autonomous spaces in which actors compete by using various forms of
capital (economic, social, cultural, or political). They compete both about
and in terms of the rules of the game of the field. Thus, the term “field”
33. Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and
Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of Law’ Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 78 (2000).
34. See id.
35. See generally Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in China Through U.S.Inspired Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60 (2009).
36. See Wilkins, supra note 28, at 4–6.
37. Jeffrey Lehman, the founding dean of a U.S. law school in Beijing, claimed that “a
rigorous application of legal pedagogy can train students who might in the future work to
strengthen China’s rule of law and its institutions.” Andy Guess, An American Law School in
China, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 22, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2008/05/22/china.
38. Erie, supra note 35, at 76–80, 86–90. See generally ESTHER LAM, CHINA AND THE
WTO: A LONG MARCH TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW (2009) (linking WTO membership with
evolution toward the rule of law).
39. See generally Golub, supra note 28 (focusing on legal empowerment through
NGOs); Wilkins, supra note 28 (discussing how corporate law firms could contribute to the
spread of the rule of law).
40. Portions of the following discussions draw on Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth,
Conclusion: How to Convert Social Capital into Legal Capital and Transfer Legitimacy
Across the Major Practice Divide, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION 260 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011) [hereinafter LAWYERS
AND THE RULE OF LAW], and Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and
Legitimating Two Sides of Transnational Justice: Possible Trajectories Toward a Unified
Transnational Field, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 277
(Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2012) [hereinafter TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE].
41. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY (1992).
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embodies a broader concept than simply the sum of the institutions that
operate in any given field.
We employ the concept of the legal field for our research, but the
contours and operation of any legal field cannot be determined a priori. To
say there is a national or transnational legal field, for example, does not
necessarily mean that different subfields operate by rules that lead to the
prosperity of the field as a whole. The relationships can only be determined
through empirical research, in particular through qualitative research into
the actors, the capital that they bring to the field, the institutions and
organizations that they create and operate, and the trajectories that actors
and institutions follow.
For the question of spillover, it is especially important to examine
channels for the circulation of agents between different national (and
transnational) legal fields or within different domains (for example,
corporate vs. human rights), as well as between the legal and political
arenas. In other words, processes of spillover can be multi-directional, both
within national spaces and between different areas of legal practice. The
convergence and complementarity between parallel phenomena determine
whether spillover is accelerated or limited. The crossing of borders
provides opportunities for reconversion and acceleration of this kind of
spillover. The topic opens up many possibilities for research. Here, we
offer only some tentative suggestions based largely on research that we
have undertaken, while focusing mainly on other questions. 42 Drawing on
that research, we take up the issue of whether what can be termed potential
“subfields” of a more general legal field may be linking up in the way that
Christopher idealized and deemed central to the legitimacy of transnational
and national governance.43
Studies of law—or the legal field, which as we noted is a broader and
more open concept—in the United States reveal structures of rewards and
careers that orient actors toward both corporate law and public service,
combining to build the prosperity of the field as a whole.44 Those who
have the highest position in corporate law draw in part on stature earned
through public service, and correspondingly, public interest law firms (and
also the government, for example) gain credibility and stature through the
corporate lawyers who typically serve on their boards.45 Higher-status
public interest entities have higher-status corporate law firms providing pro
bono volunteers and higher-status corporate lawyers serving on their
boards. 46 Similarly, the same elite credentials that qualify law graduates for
the top law firms also qualify them for the top public interest
42. See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15;
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19.
43. See Christopher, supra note 1, at 7.
44. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 49–51.
45. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Legal Services for the Poor: Access, SelfInterest, and Pro Bono, in 12 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND DEVIANCE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 145, 151–57 (Rebecca L. Sandefur ed., 2009). See generally Bryant Garth, Noblesse
Oblige as an Alternative Career Strategy, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 93 (2004).
46. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 45, at 151–53.
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organizations. 47 Even within elite legal education, the debates about the
choices of careers are framed as if these two elite careers—by contrast, for
example, a career in small firms primarily serving individuals—define the
set of appropriate options. 48
This orientation of the legal field in the United States gives strength and
legitimacy to law in the more general field of state power, which is central
to the overall prosperity of law and lawyers. The massive commitment of
elite law graduates to the service of major corporations49 does not
disqualify law as the leading language of governance and lawyers as key
members of the ruling elite. The reason is that public service and public
interest law remain central to the legal field. As Robert Gordon and others
have noted, the legitimization of Wall Street law firms at the turn of the
twentieth century through investment in good government and progressive
politics built the position of corporate lawyers as the key players of the
foreign policy establishment.50 They built complementary places in the
fields of economic and state power. 51 The incentives of actors in different
subfields promoted the success of the field as a whole. 52 Furthermore, law
schools became national law schools, and success in national law schools
and in nationally oriented careers translated into power and success within
local legal fields.53
It is not surprising that the globalization of law in the era of U.S.
hegemony has raised the question of the ability to construct something
similar globally to what has long existed in the United States. Christopher’s
prescription for U.S.-style globalization, as noted above, follows precisely
in the tradition of his mentor, Cyrus Vance, and other pillars of the foreign
policy establishment. 54 The recipes include human rights and democracy
on one side, and liberal trade policy on the other—with the link between the
two as the key to lasting legitimacy. 55 As Scott Cummings and Louise
Trubek note:
That public interest law has come to play an important role in
simultaneously advancing and contesting globalization should in some
ways come as no surprise. To the degree that globalization is built upon
the legal architecture of American-style liberal capitalism, one would
47. See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into the
Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829,
914–15 (1995).
48. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT: A MEMOIR OF HARVARD
LAW SCHOOL 3–10 (1992).
49. See, e.g., JOHN HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE
BAR 42 (2005).
50. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”: Fantasies and
Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870–1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 51–74 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
51. See Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession 1870–2000, in LAW IN
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 73, 92–98; see also Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2, at 722–26.
52. Cf. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 2, at 722–26; Gordon, supra note 51, at 92–98.
53. Cf. Gordon, supra note 51, at 75–81.
54. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 57–61.
55. See id.
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expect public interest law to occupy a similar position on the global stage
as it does in the United States . . . . 56

The mutually reinforcing legal credibility in political and economic
fields that we see in the United States provides a potential indicator of
success in the project of building a stronger position of lawyers—and the
so-called rule of law—at national and transnational levels. Despite its
taken-for-granted history in the United States,57 spillover cannot be
presumed either at the national or transnational level. The U.S. model is a
historical product embedded in U.S. politics and the U.S. social structure.58
There has long been an emphasis in the United States on circulation and
conversion as mechanisms for continuously reproducing and reinventing
the social legitimacy of lawyers. 59 This process is much more limited in
Europe and in colonial settings. 60 The profession has been less open and
more limited in terms of social class in Europe and in European colonies,
and the links between lawyers serving business and politically active
lawyers have been more attenuated.61
U.S. discourse—coming from the distinctive U.S. approach62—naturally
focuses on spillover. The traditional European model,63 whether in Europe
or transplanted as part of European colonial processes, poses significant
challenges to the successful export and import of the U.S. model. As was
the case for the earlier export of European models,64 the U.S. model relies
on a process of hegemonic diffusion into dependent societies. 65 And, as
with respect to earlier periods and other hegemonic nations, imperial
strategies are promoted as universal. They are presented as part of a
civilizing process, as modernization, or as some other benevolent project to
improve others according to the standards of the imperial power.66 And, as
with respect to other empires and universals, success is by no means
assured.
In the following parts of this Article, we explore two complementary
channels of diffusion of the U.S.-style rule of law. The first is symbolic
export from the global North to the global South. There, the focus is on
national justice and the domestic rule of law. The second form of diffusion
is the construction of transnational justice involving purportedly global
norms. We examine each of these closely related channels in turn, focusing
on whether the process of diffusion and spillover potentially brings both
sides of justice—economic and political—and whether any emerging
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Cummings & Trubek, supra note 21, at 3.
See generally Gordon, supra note 51.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 49–61, 107–11.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Gordon, supra note 51, at 92–104.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 22–31.
See id. at 2–34.
See id. at 49–61.
See generally JENNIFER PITTS, A TURN TO EMPIRE:
LIBERALISM IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (2005).
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transnational legal field is strong enough to play a major role in shaping
national legal fields, another form of spillover.
I. CONVERTING SOCIAL CAPITAL INTO LEGAL CAPITAL:
THE NATIONAL RULE-OF-LAW ALCHEMY
From the perspective of many countries, the question of spillover can be
restated as the age-old question of whether the rule of law will replace the
power of personal relations. 67 The issue is especially pervasive in writing
about the enduring power of guanxi in China.68 A variation of that same
dichotomy seen in recent literature on Asian law is that of administrative
regulation versus the rule of law.69 The power of the Korean or Japanese
bureaucracy or the Chinese Communist Party, for example, is contrasted
with the law and the courts. 70
One manifestation of the perceived problem is the close relationship
between the bureaucracy (or the party) and business. 71 One criticism is that
the mutual dependence of business and bureaucracy inhibits investment
from outsiders and independent entrepreneurs; another is that the lack of
transparent rules and practices deters investment generally. 72 Reformers
seek to make law and lawyers the key to the interactions between the state
and business, and between businesses. 73 Another manifestation is in the
dichotomy of machine politics and patronage versus law. 74 As suggested at
the outset, both of these manifestations are especially salient with respect to
Asia, which is seen as a particular challenge to the universals hailed in the
U.S.-style rule of law. The term “crony capitalism” is in part meant to
capture the kind of governance of the state and the economy thought to be
inconsistent with transparency and the rule of law. 75

67. See generally Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism, Globalization, and Rule of Law: An
Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China, 3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 195 (1994)
(contrasting Confucian approaches in Asia versus the Western rule of law).
68. See id. at 197 (describing guanxi as the “rule of relationships”); see also id. at 211–
15.
69. See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Transparency in Japanese Administrative Law, in
LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 304, 304–33 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007).
70. See id.
71. A typical example is a 2006 Special Edition of the McKinsey Quarterly, which
begins with the statement, “Two starkly contrasting futures exist for China; a market
economy under the rule of law or crony capitalism.” Wu Jinglian, The Road Ahead for
Capitalism in China, MCKINSEY Q. (2006), available at http://www.relooney.info/00_
New_2477.pdf
72. See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Introduction: A Framework for the Analysis of Legal
Institutions in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 1–10 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
73. This point is made by Saegusa in her discussion of legal education reform in Japan.
Mayumi Saegusa, Why the Japanese Law School System Was Established: Cooptation as a
Defensive Tactic in the Face of Global Pressures, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 365, 377–78
(2009).
74. See Jinglian, supra note 71, at 119–20.
75. See DAVID C. KANG, CRONY CAPITALISM: CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH
KOREA AND THE PHILIPPINES 1–20 (2002).
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The problem of spillover in this context is whether the rule of law can be
strengthened by the various activities that are now being promoted by
reformers from the West. There is the hope that, for example, better
teaching in the law faculties will strengthen the position of lawyers and
make them leading problem solvers; that the creation of legal aid programs
will lead citizens to see the law as a tool for the enforcement of rights; or
that the proliferation of corporate lawyers and law firms will reshape
business conduct away from the dominance of personal relationships
toward more legally based transactions. Each program, according to
reformers, has the potential to make law count more and personal relations
count less in China.
Our approach begins with the idea that these dichotomies—variations on
law versus personal relations—are not in opposition to each other but rather
are potentially complementary. The social capital of personal relationships
and legal capital do not represent opposing approaches. The legal requires
the personal, and the personal may gain from the legal. Legal capital gains
value to the extent that social capital is embedded in the law. Similarly, the
power of social and economic relations can be strengthened through the
legitimacy that the law can provide.
The issue of spillover at the national level therefore turns on the question
of how and whether activities in a sector of law and the legal field lead to
the accumulation of social capital that can be transformed into legal capital.
Put in our sociological terms, therefore, we examine the continuing
renegotiation of the rate of exchange and division of role in that process.
The renegotiation process involves not only personal relations, the state,
and the party, but also relationships between different governing knowledge
and different ideologies. Stated simply, the power and legitimacy of law
and lawyers depends on the law’s relationship to state capital, family
capital, and economic capital in particular. To the extent that those with the
advantages of family, resources, and access to the machinery of government
invest in law and use law and legal language to legitimate their power, the
legal field will gain strength. Conversely, if lawyers do not attract the well
connected and powerful, and if lawyers are cut off from state and economic
power, the legal field will be weakened.
Focusing on Asia as a particular test, the challenge can be stated simply.
China, Japan, and South Korea are the largest economies in Asia; each
developed historically within the Chinese Confucian sphere, and that
history arguably fortifies a different approach to governance than the
approach promoted in the West. 76 Further, since World War II, the models
for development of all three countries have differed from the West’s
preferred paradigm. 77 South Korea and Japan helped define the East Asian
model of state-led and export-driven development, 78 and China, led by the
76. See generally KANG, supra note 9.
77. See, e.g., FISHLOW ET AL., MIRACLE OF DESIGN? LESSONS FROM THE EAST ASIAN
EXPERIENCE (1994).
78. ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF
GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 73–112 (2003).
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Communist Party, has experienced a gradual opening to capitalist
initiatives. 79
We do not have the space to explore the particular mechanisms of
governance in these three countries, but we can make a few observations
about the place of law and lawyers, and how that place might be changing
in relation to globalization. We draw on the recent literature to see if there
is evidence of a strengthened role for law and lawyers in the state or in the
economy—or gaining strength in both, as in the idealized version of law in
governance.
The first concern, as noted above, is the extent to which social capital is
becoming embedded in the law. The Chinese legal profession is divided
between a relatively small corporate bar and the large rank and file of
mainly criminal lawyers.80 The literature suggests that the criminal bar
remains relatively marginal and, for the most part, weak in valued capital
such as relationships to the Communist Party and the government. 81 In
fact, Ethan Michelson explains that those in the criminal bar with the
closest connections to the government or former government careers are
more likely to have a relatively high opinion of the legal system. 82 The
relative status of these lawyers leads them to be taken more seriously and
therefore to be better able to resist the interference of local party officials
and bureaucrats. 83 The corporate bar in China has accumulated more
status, but it remains in a situation reminiscent of the colonial bar found
historically in foreign enclaves. 84 The corporate lawyers mainly serve as
go-betweens for foreign clients investing in or trading with the Chinese.85
It does not appear that corporate lawyers are playing any role in Chinese
politics, much less in any effort to legalize politics.86 Thus, the evidence to
date for spillover fueled by the accumulation of social capital into legal
capital is very thin in China, despite any number of reform projects
promoted by the West. 87
The Japanese bar, by contrast, has a long commitment to social justice
issues, and Japanese lawyers enjoy the prestige that accompanies the bar’s
very small size and prosperity. 88 From that perspective, again in contrast to
79. See, e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 7, at 26–81.
80. See Randall Peerenboom, Searching for Political Liberalism in All the Wrong
Places: The Legal Profession in China as the Leading Edge of Political Reform?, in
LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 239, 248, 250.
81. See Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity
in China’s Transition from Socialism, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at
39, 42–43; Peerenboom, supra note 80, at 250–52.
82. Michelson, supra note 81, at 50–53.
83. Id.
84. See Sida Liu, Client Influence and the Contingency of Professionalism: The Work of
Elite Corporate Lawyers in China, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 751, 758–63 (2006).
85. See id.
86. Peerenboom, supra note 80, at 248.
87. Dezalay & Garth, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 263–65.
88. Malcolm Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa, The State, Civil Society, and the Legal
Complex in Modern Japan: Continuity and Change, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL CHANGE 151, 175 (M. Feeley
et al. eds., 2008).
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China, the bar appears to have built up credibility and social capital. But
there are strong limits that disconnect the Japanese bar from politics and the
economy. When the increasingly powerful military asserted itself in the
period between World Wars I and II, the independent bar found a small but
highly profitable niche as litigators, and its lawyers were fortified with
legitimacy as moral champions of social justice.89 Lawyers in Japan had
considerable prestige, but the number of lawyers admitted to the bar was
very small. The state had relatively little difficulty thwarting the efforts of
lawyers to take on new terrain and play a role representing new social
groups or interests. 90 Similarly, the Japanese corporate bar did not develop
in a way that facilitated movement into state power or economic power. 91
We can surmise that the long pedigrees of the Japanese business
interests—the keiretsu groups—linked them directly to the Japanese state
bureaucracy and governing party. 92 The existing establishment in Japan
was relatively cohesive, and that cohesiveness was maintained after World
War II. 93 Legitimacy was assured with the continuity of the Emperor on
the one hand, and electoral democracy on the other. As with China, there
was no crisis of legitimacy—for example, a discredited authoritarian state,
overactive military, etc.—which internationally oriented lawyers could use
to build up their role in the field of state power. Further, since the economy
was relatively closed for much of the period after World War II, 94 the
corporate bar did not benefit from the growth and legitimacy that might be
grounded on a strong foreign clientele. The corporate bar is certainly
growing. There is evidence that graduates of the most prestigious schools
have shifted career priorities in favor of the corporate law firms, 95 but this
growth has been relatively recent.
In these circumstances, the social capital that Japanese lawyers possessed
has not converted to state capital. Stated in the language of spillover, the
legitimacy for one part of legal practice—the more traditional litigation
practice—has moved slowly both to corporate law and to state power, and
vice versa. To date, the spheres are very separate. Lawyers have not been
able to accumulate the requisite social capital. In some respects, therefore,
the bar in Japan is in a far better position than its Chinese counterpart, but
there has not been much opportunity for lawyers to make themselves useful
as brokers between business and state interests, and between such interests
and international investors.
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id.
91. See Kay-Wah Chan, The Reform of the Profession of Lawyers in Japan and Its
Impact on the Role of Law, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 185, 191–
97.
92. See id. at 186–87.
93. See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925–1975 (1982).
94. Id. at 83–115.
95. See Chan, supra note 91, at 196–97; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, Law’s
Dominion and the Market for Legal Elites in Japan, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 451, 466–
74 (2003).
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In South Korea, by contrast, we see a faster transformation than in the
other contexts largely because of the decline in legitimacy for the military
and authoritarian government. 96 As in Japan, there was a small but
relatively prestigious legal profession (indeed built by the Japanese),97 and
a well-established corporate bar focused on foreign trade and investment.98
The authoritarian regime, which lasted until the late 1980s, saw a number of
lawyers who championed the victims of military repression.99 They could
then present themselves as organic intellectuals of the new social forces
emerging with the transition to democracy. The activists and the corporate
bar had very strong ties to the United States, and could draw on those links
and the ideology of empowering civil society and law to promote nonradical democratic politics.100 The politics offered a strong role for lawyers
who had previously been marginalized in the military regime. 101 In the
language of capital exchange, these lawyers were well positioned to obtain
a favorable rate of exchange for their legal capital in the relationship
between the representatives of the old regime—the chaebols, 102 economists
linked to the United States, and others—and the new groups emerging after
democracy and liberalization. The circumstances of a political crisis of the
authoritarian regime—fueled both by domestic and international opposition
(since the United States, with the end of the Cold War, no longer supported
authoritarian anti-communist regimes) 103—changed the terms quickly and
moved lawyers, including a number of corporate lawyers, into much
stronger positions in the field of state power. Another feature of South
Korea was the number of Korean-Americans who returned both before and
after democratization, with many working in the large corporate law
firms. 104 They strengthened the ability of Korean firms to handle major
transactions involving global trade and commerce, and they also brought a
capital of relationships and credentials from the United States.
When guns and economists were not enough for international credibility,
lawyers could speak the international language of democracy and human
rights, and build U.S.-like institutions to promote those views. The
relatively quick accumulation of social capital into legal capital in South
Korea has, in contrast to China and Japan, strongly increased the value of
legal capital and therefore the strength of the legal field.
Indonesia represents a similar case worthy of note. Because of its
importance in the Cold War,105 Indonesia, like South Korea, was strongly
96. See Kim Seong-Hyun, The Democratization and Internationalization of the Korean
Legal Field, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 217, 230–32.
97. See id. at 220–21.
98. See id. at 222–28.
99. See id. at 228–30.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 230–32.
102. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 242–45.
103. See id. at 237–42.
104. Id. at 241; Kim, supra note 96, at 225.
105. See ADAM SCHWARZ, A NATION IN WAITING: INDONESIA’S SEARCH FOR STABILITY 22
(1999).
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embedded in the U.S. marketplace of ideas and intellectual exchange.106
Here, too, U.S.-trained economists as technocrats provided an essential part
of the original legitimacy of the military’s authoritarian regime, and the
U.S. generally helped to sustain the regime as a bulwark against
communism. 107 Although lawyers were mainly outside the government,
they built a role as corporate lawyers serving investors from abroad who
poured money into Indonesia when Suharto opened up the economy in the
mid-1960s. 108 The attraction of raw materials and a divided economy,
owned in part by the government and the military and in part by ethnic
Chinese families, 109 provided opportunities for elite lawyers to build a
brokering and mediating role. Their elite status and foreign connections
also allowed these lawyers to combine their profitable service as corporate
lawyers with investment in legal aid and human rights. These initiatives
were more or less tolerated by the Suharto government because of their
relative moderation, as well as the social position of the lawyers and their
ties to the United States. 110 They were therefore able to rebuild some of the
stature lost during the Cold War and the developmental state.
What began in the 1970s in Indonesia gained strength in the 1980s—
especially after the financial crisis toppled Suharto—and now has emerged
a generation later as a taken-for-granted role for lawyers in and especially
around state power. 111 As in China, philanthropy and development
assistance have gone into legal aid and a variety of forms of public interest
law, but the spillover successes came from the relationship of that
investment to brokers well connected to the Indonesian state and economy.
Lawyers with international connections and training are at the forefront of
today’s modernization in Indonesia.
There is another dimension to the question of the legitimacy of law and
lawyers—and the likely spillover across sectors of the profession—that we
have not yet addressed. The market of legal education has a potential role
to play. Legal education is one of several important places for the
production of the legitimacy of law. It is a place where social capital and
political capital can be turned into legitimate legal capital. We develop this
point further in the concluding part of this Article, but first continue the
emphasis on Asian countries and the potential challenge they provide for
spillover and more general legal legitimacy. Interestingly, China, Japan,
and South Korea have all recently stepped up their efforts to Americanize
their legal education.112 We contrast these efforts in the remainder of this
part.
Lawyer-activists in South Korea early in the twenty-first century came up
with the idea of moving the undergraduate system of legal education toward
106. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 121–28.
107. See BRADLEY SIMPSON, ECONOMISTS WITH GUNS: AUTHORITARIAN DEVELOPMENT
AND U.S.-INDONESIAN RELATIONS 1960–68, at 219–36 (2008).
108. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 218–26.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 223.
111. See id. at 224–26.
112. Dezalay & Garth, in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 263.
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the graduate J.D. model found in the United States.113 The idea was picked
up in Japan, and in 2004, Japan was the first of the two to adopt this new
approach. 114 The hope of reformers in Japan was to increase the supply of
lawyers—in particular, corporate lawyers—who would serve Japanese and
foreign businesses and increase the role of law as compared to that of
personal relations and the Japanese state bureaucracy. 115 They sought to
make bar passage simpler in an effort to encourage law students to learn
problem-solving and practical skills rather than focus only on the bar,
which often led students to attend bar prep courses rather than their law
school courses. 116 The reformers also hoped to encourage more wellrounded students to come to law, since the model contemplated law as a
graduate rather than undergraduate degree.117
Despite the creation of some seventy law schools, 118 the system does not
appear to have been changed dramatically to date. Bar passage is not as
high as reformers had hoped, and the bar in particular has strongly resisted
the increase in the supply of lawyers and the relaxation of the bar passage
standards. 119 It is relatively early, but commentators do not deem the
reforms a success in converting the position and potential role of lawyers in
Japan. 120
By contrast, South Korea built upon a closer connection with the growing
position of law and lawyers in the Korean state.121 Part of the difference is
time. We can see in retrospect that South Korean lawyers in the 1980s
began to build their position in relation to changes in the state and what the
state sought in international credibility. 122 The passage of time allowed the
change to become embedded and naturalized. It is not surprising that the
cosmopolitan political role for lawyers now seems to be taken more for
granted. The new law schools in South Korea fit this new context.123 They
are geared to admit and train students who are not just the traditional law
students selected because they can perform well on an exam that mainly
tests memorization. Such examinations tended to favor lower-middle-class
students driven to succeed. 124 The new schools select not only on the basis

113. Id.
114. See generally D.H. Foote, Forces Driving and Shaping Legal Training Reform in
Japan, 7 AUSTRALIAN J. ASIAN L. 214 (2006); Saegusa, supra note 73; Takahiro Saito, The
Tragedy of Japanese Legal Education: Japanese ‘American’ Law Schools, 24 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 197 (2006).
115. See Saegusa, supra note 73, at 372–78.
116. See Chan, supra note 91, at 188–91; Saegusa, supra note 73, at 372–78.
117. Saito, supra note 114, at 197.
118. Id.
119. Chan, supra note 91, at 207–08.
120. For a suggestion that the entire effort is counterproductive, see Annelise Riles &
Takashi Uchida, Reforming Knowledge? A Socio-legal Critique of the Legal Education
Reforms in Japan, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 3 (2009).
121. See Kim, supra note 96, at 232–33.
122. See id. at 228–34.
123. Id. at 233.
124. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, International Strategies and Local
Transformations: Preliminary Observations of the Position of Law in the Field of State
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of exams, but also on travel experience, linguistic ability, service to NGOs,
and the like—potentially a recognition of the new elite role for lawyers.125
Legal education reform in South Korea, as sought in Japan, is about
improving the engagement of students, enhancing skills and problemsolving, and enlarging the corporate bar; but it is also about matching those
improved legal capabilities with students better endowed with social
capital.
Let us turn to the situation of China. As noted before, the hope of many
rule-of-law proponents has been that various reforms or innovations might
serve as Trojan horses on behalf of individual rights and the rule of law.
What happens in one area will spill over into others, in particular the
Chinese state. Administrative or party guidance will turn into a more
neutral rule of law. Spillover applies directly to the issue of lawyers as
brokers, taking advantage of opportunities—especially crisis moments—to
make connections that strengthen their own position and provide a new
version of state legitimacy. In China, there has also been some investment
in the reform of legal education, including modeling a J.M. degree program
after the U.S. J.D. degree 126 and the introduction of clinical education—
again modeled after the United States. 127 It is also indicative—and
reminiscent of the early days of the Soochow Law School and its foreigntrained faculty—that the effort, beginning in 2007, to build an Americanstyle law school at Beijing University, has attracted considerable attention
inside and outside of China.128 The undergraduate faculties of law,
however, seem still to be more prestigious, and most lawyers remain in a
relatively marginal position. 129 Those with the most prestige, namely the
relatively small corporate bar, remain outside of the main world of Chinese
politics and the state.130 As elsewhere in Asia, the market in legal
education reveals much about the prospects for any kind of spillover from
corporate law into state governance.
Corporate law firms provide another potential site for the conversion of
capital. The example of South Korea is but one of many where corporate
law firms bring together people moving in and out of the government,
leading families, legal expertise, and domestic and international legal
capital. One part of the success to date in South Korea has been the
credibility within South Korea—built through Cold War projects of
educational exchange, links to human rights NGOs and corporate law firms,
Power in Asia: South Korea, in RAISING THE BAR: THE EMERGING LEGAL PROFESSION IN
EAST ASIA 81, 94–96 (William P. Alford ed., 2007).
125. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9, at 245–46.
126. Erie, supra note 35, at 61.
127. See Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of
Law and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 117, 128–29 (2005); see
also Cai Yanmin & J.L. Pottenger, Jr., The “Chinese Characteristics” of Clinical Legal
Education, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT: EDUCATING LAWYERS FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE
87, 87–91 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011).
128. See generally Anne M. Burr, Law and Harmony: An In-Depth Look at China’s First
American-Style Law School, 28 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 25 (2010).
129. Erie, supra note 35, at 75.
130. Peerenboom, supra note 80, at 248.
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and considerable economic exchange—of approaches emanating from and
consistent with the United States. 131 By contrast, to the extent that such
approaches are deemed to lack domestic credibility, it will be more difficult
for corporate law firms to make such conversions of transnational exported
capital into legitimate national capital.
The ideals of Christopher and those linked to his position seek more than
building the rule of law in national settings throughout the globe. They
seek also to take the principles of free trade and investment, democracy, and
human rights, and embed them in transnational institutions.132 We turn
now to this parallel strategy, which faces the same issues of spillover and
credibility. Given the challenges we have already seen at the national level,
the question is whether activity at the transnational level can entrench the
same kinds of rules and institutions into some form of transnational
governance.
II. TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE: POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES TOWARD
A UNIFIED TRANSNATIONAL FIELD
The ultimate fate of transnational justice—and transnational rules as the
bases for determining “modern” and legitimate local rules—depends on the
ability of legal entrepreneurs to make the case that the globalization of law
is not just about allowing multinational corporations to profit globally
according to transnational rules of the game. Transnational law must be
more than a tool to overcome more restrictive policies promoted by
individual states. The challenge, as we have noted, is to build credibility
for propositions such as that transnational law and procedures may prevent
states from committing injustices to their own and other citizens. It may
also prevent corporations from using their global reach to enhance profits
by abusing individuals and harming the environment, in addition to
restricting the ability of states to regulate foreign investment within their
boundaries. The question, therefore, is whether two sides of a potential
transnational legal field will both take hold. One is the transnational
political side, exemplified by international human rights and peacekeeping;
the other is the transnational economic side, exemplified by international
commercial arbitration, corporate law, the global trade regime, and the
global rules for intellectual property.
The first section of this part explores the development of a transnational
legal field. It draws on studies of transnational phenomena that we have
undertaken in the past. 133 In particular, international commercial arbitration
131. See generally GREGG BRAZINSKY, NATION BUILDING IN SOUTH KOREA: KOREANS,
AMERICANS, AND THE MAKING OF A DEMOCRACY (2007).
132. According to Cummings and Trubek,
While Rule of Law initiatives have embedded public interest law at the nationstate level, the evolution of the institutional framework of global governance—the
second globalizing factor we highlight—has drawn public interest law into the
contest over the impact of open markets and the power of human rights at the
supranational level.
Cummings & Trubek, supra note 21, at 6.
133. See generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15; DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19.
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provides a prime example of transnational economic justice, and the field of
international human rights exemplifies transnational political justice.
Drawing on others’ work, we also briefly examine peacekeeping,
transnational criminal law, and transitional justice on one side, and trade
and intellectual property on the other.134 Taken together, these domains
cover much of what exists as the potential for a transnational legal field.
They encompass the potential linkage between corporate law firms on one
side, and legally oriented NGOs on the other.
Our approach in this section requires a little more elaboration of our
research strategy. As we have emphasized in all of our work, sociological
research into the operation of national or transnational fields requires
analyses of the people who operate in and define the various fields. 135
Personal interviews reveal where key actors come from, what forms of
capital they bring to the field, how that capital is valued in terms of career
trajectories, and what drives the competition for dominant positions in the
field. By tracking a number of individuals’ activities, we can also link the
national and transnational. Actors use their national capital to gain stature
internationally, and vice versa. The synchronic approach focusing on the
present structure of fields is then joined with a more diachronic approach—
examining, in particular, the genesis of the fields being studied and the
institutions that inhabit those fields.
For the purpose of this part of the Article, we use both the geneses and
further evolutions to contrast the developments on the political and
economic side of a potential transnational legal field. We explore whether
the two subfields provide possible paths toward a more unified field—a
transnational manifestation of the spillover effect. As we will show, the
major differences between the political and economic sides appear after the
period of the geneses. The geneses of the transnational fields or subfields
in fact reveal many parallels between the political and economic
developments.
As with respect to institutions and the fields in which they operate more
generally, the forces evident at the beginning are typically obscured once
institutions become more established and appear more natural. The passage
of time, consistent with the Weberian paradigm, 136 brings routinization—
evidenced by the repeat players who operate the institutions. We can see
this development on both the political and the economic sides. This second
phase, however, despite the apparent success and naturalness of the legal
developments, is characterized by much more distinction between the two
subfields. From this comparative perspective, the prospects for the
economic side of transnational justice appear much brighter than those for
the more political side. In this sense, we suggest a lack of spillover, or
more precisely, an asymmetry in the development of the transnational field.
134. See generally TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40 (an edited collection of case
studies of the transnational sphere).
135. See, e.g., Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Constructing Transnational Justice, in
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 3, 4–6.
136. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 36–37.
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The parallel paths appear to be diverging, and divergence poses an obstacle
to the unified transnational field that enhances the credibility of law and
lawyers.
In order to see potential means for further convergence, we introduce the
example of the transnational legal field in Europe. The study of the
relatively successful process of building transnational justice at the
European level helps to generate potential hypotheses for how a similar
process might proceed in the more general transnational legal field. It is
also not just a matter of comparison and hypothesis generation. As
discussed in Part II.B, the process in Europe involves lawyers drawing on
their national capital, scholarly investment, transnational contacts and
capital, and courts initially established with very limited roles—the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the economic side and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the more political side—to develop and
legitimate law on both sides.
Both European courts moved from their relatively limited initial agendas
to become quasi-constitutional courts. 137 Furthermore, as they moved, they
built—and competed with each other in constructing—transnational legal
credibility that facilitated a transnational knowledge that crossed the
boundaries between the corporate and regulatory domains and the human
rights or governance domains. 138 The post-World War II history of Europe,
in short, provides both a key example and a component of the development
of transnational legal fields.
Finally, drawing on hypotheses generated by the European example and
the history of the United States, we examine other potential factors that may
bring the two dimensions of the transnational legal field together. In
particular, we briefly examine what has been termed the globalization of
legal education.
A. Initial Phases in the Development of a Transnational Legal Field
The initial phase in both the economic side and the political side of the
emerging transnational field was very similar. For both the human rights
side and international commercial arbitration, there was a crisis situation or
shock effect that allowed the initial accumulation of legal investment.139
The shocks can be seen as external to the legal world—they were
experienced as political or economic events—but they provided
opportunities that played out in the legal world.
The process involves an almost accidental production of “avatars”
representing a potential legalization in a particular arena. 140 As is true with
137. See generally Antonin Cohen, The European Court of Justice in the Emergent
European Field of Power: Transnational Judicial Institutions and National Career Paths, in
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 239.
138. See id. at 239–49.
139. See NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM
(2007).
140. Andrew Abbott, Linked Ecologies: States and Universities as Environments for
Professions, 23 SOC. THEORY 245, 265–66 (2005).
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respect to legal production generally, transnational law is not a product that
simply arises in response to a demand or need. Neither international human
rights nor international commercial arbitration, despite what may appear in
retrospect, developed simply because there was a problem that the law
naturally came in to solve. Rather, lawyer-brokers played a key role in
building and legitimating the market for their services and expertise. One
key to the creation of new institutions is the inability of existing courts and
more traditional law to adjust quickly to dramatic social and political
changes precipitated by particular crises.
1. International Commercial Arbitration
The development of international commercial arbitration is closely linked
to crises associated with decolonization and the battles for the control of oil
production in the period after World War II. 141 Oil nationalizations were
symptomatic of the rise of nationalism and the erosion of the paternalistic
relationship between the Seven Sister oil companies and national leaders.142
These tensions led to the creation of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and culminated in the oil crisis of the
1970s. 143 As the price of oil went up, the stakes of the control over oil
profits increased dramatically. 144 Oil companies whose positions were
threatened lined up the support of their home countries, and together
invested substantial resources into rebuilding their prior lucrative
positions. 145 Law was not at the core of the response. Managers and
lawyers of the oil industry used diplomacy, the threat of gun boats, and
personal relationships to respond to the nationalizations and other attacks
on their position. For the most part, they were successful in maintaining
their role in the production and distribution of petroleum resources.146
Histories of these events typically do not even mention law or lawyers,147
but lawyer-entrepreneurs took advantage of the situation.
The longstanding concession agreements entered into between the oil
companies and the oil-producing states contained arbitration clauses.148
The clauses were inserted because of the perceived legitimacy of state-state
arbitration and the role of international law experts who consulted with the
large oil companies. 149 The companies chose to invoke the arbitration
clauses as one additional option, but they paid very little attention to the
processes or outcomes since the key—no matter what the outcome of the
arbitration—remained negotiations and the power that could be mobilized

141. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 74–86.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 77–78.
144. See id. at 78–81.
145. See id. at 83–85.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER
(1991).
148. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 86–88.
149. See id.
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to support them. 150 Arbitration was very much a sideshow, and the blank
check for the arbitrations was dwarfed by the resources used for other
strategies.
The experts in arbitration were at that point a group of law professors and
others, centered in Paris at the International Chamber of Commerce, who
studied and promoted arbitration as a kind of hobby. 151 They professed the
virtues of international commercial arbitration as a way to resolve
transnational commercial disputes. 152 Their ties to the oil industry were
relatively weak at the time, but they were brought into the arbitrations and
provided them with what amounted to essentially unlimited resources.153
They already had produced a body of legal scholarship that could provide
some of the raw material necessary to equip the field.154 Further, their
students from the global South—including Algeria and Egypt—were ready
to see the virtues of arbitrations that would involve their mentors and likely
also themselves.
Partly because it was a sideshow, the arbitration lawyers on both sides
were able to treat the legal disputes as epic legal battles involving grand
legal principles. Lawyers in the nationalization cases developed highly
formal legal arguments while the actual resolutions of the disputes
proceeded by other means. 155 The result was a series of closely reasoned
arbitral opinions that have long been the staple of international law
courses. 156 They had virtually no practical impact at the time, but here, as
elsewhere, that lack of practical impact allowed the field to develop.
Legal capital accumulated through initial investments, and then later,
through the outpouring of scholarship promoting, rationalizing, and
elaborating the jurisprudence of the arbitration cases—and making the cases
central to casebooks. 157 Those with key positions in the cases gained
stature and credibility, and this combination of factors jump-started this
transnational legal field and put it in a perfect position to take advantage of
the disputes that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as petrodollars and
Eurodollars were invested in major infrastructure projects leading to major
arbitrations. 158 The oil crises, in short, provided the funding and credibility
to a group of self-proclaimed amateurs and hobbyists who later became the
backbone of the international commercial arbitration industry in the 1980s.
2. International Human Rights
As with respect to international commercial arbitration, the key actors
and events that led to the creation of the field of international human rights
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 83–84.
See id. at 34–36.
See id.
See id. at 84–85.
See id. at 88–89.
See id. at 85.
See id. at 74–75.
See id. at 84–85.
See id. at 93–97.
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involved a very different group than the legal actors who developed and
then profited from the field. 159 Again, the starting point was a series of
international crises, in this case revolving around the politics of the Cold
War. Guerrilla movements existed in much of Latin America; 160 there was
a democratic socialist movement in Chile,161 and there were violent military
reactions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and elsewhere. 162 The hardening of
U.S. positions after Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba helped to fortify
these authoritarian reactions. 163 As with respect to the early period of
international commercial arbitration, there existed a group that could almost
be called international human rights hobbyists.
The relatively small group of human rights activists played a fairly
marginal role in the so-called cultural Cold War, exemplified by the CIA
sponsorship of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on one side,
and by communist ties to the International Association of Democratic
Jurists (IADJ) on the left. 164 Amnesty International, founded in 1961, was
an outgrowth of the ICJ seeking to gain more of a distance from the
partisanship of the Cold War.165 As with respect to the amateurs of
international commercial arbitration, there were idealistic actors in and
around these groups who sought to build on the human rights developments
that came in the aftermath of World War II. But again, it is instructive that
histories of the Cold War generally do not view human rights activists as
influential enough to merit discussion. 166
In the United States, palace wars related to the Cold War took a major
turn in the late 1960s in relationship to the U.S. militancy exemplified in the
support of authoritarian regimes, and especially in the Vietnam War. 167
Campus uprisings and the split in the Democratic Party over Cold War
tactics led to the election of Richard Nixon.168 The so-called “hawks” in
power in the United States supported the coup that brought Pinochet to
power in Chile in 1973. 169 The so-called “doves,” whose growth had split
the U.S. establishment, retained considerable power.170 They controlled the
elite universities, the major philanthropic foundations, a good portion of the
Congress, and much of the establishment media.171 Nevertheless, they
were powerless to stop the Nixon Administration’s embrace of
159. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19; Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, From the
Cold War to Kosovo: The Rise and Renewal of International Human Rights, 2 ANN REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 231, 231–55 (2006).
160. See generally THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA (5th
ed. 2001).
161. See id. at 126–32.
162. See id. at 93–95, 133–35, 169–72.
163. See id. at 269–73.
164. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 159, at 240.
165. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 70–72.
166. See generally JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE COLD WAR: A NEW HISTORY (2005).
167. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 127–30.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 241–47.
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authoritarianism in Latin America and elsewhere. 172 There were continued
demonstrations on campuses, peace campaigns, and other oppositional
activities that are the center of what historians depict when they examine
the 1960s and early 1970s. 173
The out-of-power elite invested in the legal terrain as one of their
strategies. They found in the discourse of human rights a tool that they
could use at least rhetorically against the Nixon Administration. 174 They
discovered and began to work with groups like Amnesty International.175
They also found that many lawyers and activists in the South were pleased
to embrace and contribute to this discourse, since it freed them from the
more politicized mantle of simply defending communists or
revolutionaries. 176 In particular, leftist labor lawyers in Argentina, 177 and a
group of elite lawyers in Chile close to the administration of Salvador
Allende, became connected to, among others, the international media, elite
bar groups, Amnesty International, and the Ford and MacArthur
Foundations. 178 Later, when they were exiled, those elite lawyers joined
groups such as Amnesty International and became human rights
professionals. 179
The moral, political, religious, and economic resources that now
mobilized to question Cold War tactics and the support of repressive states
were invested in this new transnational field. An outpouring of academic
research brought further credibility. Amnesty International won the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1977, and the Chilean model of human rights advocacy
spread around the globe with the aid of the Ford Foundation. 180 Human
rights activism and scholarship became very prominent in elite law schools
in the North and the South. 181 By the end of the Reagan Administration,
the international human rights movement was powerful enough to have a
very strong practical impact on U.S. foreign policy. 182 When Pinochet
sought to stay in power, for example, the United States under Reagan—and
led by Reagan Administration officials who came to embrace human
rights—forced him to submit to an election that pushed him from office.183
In both cases, the relatively weak links between the shocks and the legal
repercussions created opportunities for autonomous investment using
outside resources, both economic and scholarly. These outside investments
built the transnational legal infrastructure for both arbitration and human
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., GADDIS, supra note 166, at 146.
174. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 127–33.
175. See id. at 70–72.
176. See id. at 52–54.
177. See Virginia Vecchioli, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Argentina:
Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Transformation of the National Legal Field, in
LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 40, at 93, 97.
178. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 145–48.
179. Id. at 147.
180. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 159, at 239–44.
181. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 164–67.
182. See id. at 134–36.
183. Id. at 135.
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rights. It turned the hobbyists of arbitration into well-paid lawyers and
arbitrators in the service of transnational private justice, and it turned labor
lawyers in Argentina, criminal lawyers in Chile, and civil rights lawyers in
the United States into human rights lawyers in the service of a global
human rights regime prominent in foreign policy decision making around
the globe.
Part of this process can be portrayed as a boomerang effect: initially
weak institutions and legal fields turn into much stronger ones with altered
and ambitious agendas. Mikael Madsen focuses on this impact for the
human rights field in Europe, 184 where the French and British governments
initially endorsed European human rights developments—the creation of
the Council of Europe, the European Commission on Human Rights, and
the ECHR—because they were sure that they were immune from any
challenges. 185 They were on the human rights side in the Cold War as
representatives of the anti-Communist West. 186 They also were careful to
make sure that their relationships with colonies were not included in the
treaties that created these institutions. 187 But the initial Cold War
orientation shifted, and the evolving European human rights regime took
aim at the repressive means by which European countries policed their
colonies, especially the French in Algeria and the British in Northern
Ireland. 188 The boomerang impact of investment made for other purposes
was not limited to activities in the colonies. The ECHR now regularly takes
on the criminal justice systems of the countries under its jurisdiction.189
The institutions literally bounce back on the original objectives of the
founders—very much contrary to the founders’ aims and expectations.
Another phenomenon that contributes to these developments toward
institutionalization has long typified initiatives in the law. Often a new
principle is announced in a judicial opinion, for example, but not enforced
or implemented. 190 It represents a kind of trial balloon; professors may
then pick it up, it may be discussed and legitimated for particular purposes,
and finally, it can be enforced and elaborated upon in new cases as if it was
not really a new departure. This is the classic approach of cases such as
Marbury v. Madison, 191 but it is also the story of arbitration and human

184. See generally Mikael Rask Madsen, France, the UK, and the ‘Boomerang’ of the
Internationalisation of Human Rights (1945–2000), in HUMAN RIGHTS BROUGHT HOME:
SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 57 (Simon
Halliday & Patrick Schmidt eds., 2004).
185. See id. at 59–60, 63, 77.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 60.
188. Id. at 71, 85.
189. See, e.g., Jacquelin S. Hodgson, Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in Europe: A
Comparative Perspective, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 611, 657–65 (2011).
190. Cf. Antonin Cohen & Antoine Vauchez, The Social Construction of Law: The
European Court of Justice and Its Legal Revolution Revisited, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
417, 426 (2011); Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, Van Gend
en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1, 17 (2010).
191. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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rights (and the ECJ). 192 The academic credibility takes hold before the
practical political and economic impacts. It is easy to see how this process
played out with respect to both international commercial arbitration and
international human rights.
In short, political and economic crises may contribute to change by
setting events in motion that at some point find their way to new
institutional approaches to law. There are many other examples of major
political and economic events triggering—almost by accident—relatively
weak but later significant legal initiatives, but only a few of them have been
studied in depth from this perspective. For example, the unsuccessful effort
by the Argentine generals to take back the Malvinas/Falkland Islands from
the British led to the fall of the military regime. This provided an
opportunity to invest in new legal institutions, almost as sideshows, leading
to the Argentine Truth Commission and ultimately to the phenomenon of
transitional justice, which spread around the globe. 193 Similarly, the
environmental disaster associated with Union Carbide and Bhopal set in
motion more legalized approaches to transnational environmental issues.194
The drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after the end of
World War II is an antecedent to the human rights movement that is part of
the story we earlier summarized, but it too can be placed into a similar
pattern. As with respect to all these examples, any starting point can be
moved back to find earlier antecedents and crises. In any event, the role
that the Universal Declaration came to play went far beyond what was
initially envisioned.195
Finally, the legalization of transnational trade brought about through the
WTO can be linked especially to the Japan-U.S. trade crisis in the 1970s
and, again, to the relatively few legal idealists—among them U.S.
academics Robert Hudec and John Jackson—who helped to take major
foreign policy trade issues and build a scholarly infrastructure that later
served as the basis to legalize international trade with the transition from
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the WTO. 196 In
each of these cases, as with respect to international commercial arbitration
and human rights, we see the emergence of new institutions in part because
the dramatic social and political changes precipitated by crises do not
translate into changes that courts and traditional legal doctrine can readily
absorb.
There were some links between the human rights side and the economic
regulation side in the account provided above, but they were relatively weak
at the initial stages. Each came into its own in the 1980s after a period of
192. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 81–86; Madsen, supra note 184, at 77–80.
193. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 235–42.
194. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1484, 1487 (1991).
195. See WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
“A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 51–75 (1998).
196. See JOSEPH A. CONTI, BETWEEN LAW AND DIPLOMACY: THE SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF
DISPUTING AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 28–58 (2011); Dezalay & Garth, supra
note 2, at 743–49.
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crisis-generated investment in the 1970s. The paths that they followed were
relatively similar, even though the people were for the most part quite
different.
The relative success in institutionalization with respect to both human
rights and arbitration, coupled with the passage of time, brought a degree of
routinization. Institutions through this process become naturalized and
decontextualized such that the particular crises and political and economic
configurations that produced them become obscured. Instead of appearing
as the product of particular strategies and configurations of interests, such
as those at play in the Cold War or the oil crises, the semi-autonomous field
and its institutions come to appear much more neutral and universal. Legal
doctrines are taught as such in law schools, sustained and further formalized
through legal scholarship, used to resolve disputes, and in general
legitimated and taken for granted—treated as simply the law. As a result,
the legal fields generally develop some distance from the specific interests
evident at the inception and embedded in the structures of the fields.
The field of international commercial arbitration in the 1960s and 1970s
worked out a set of rules to enforce oil concessions against sovereign
states. 197 As noted above, the rules had little impact at the time they were
developed. But when arbitration took off in the 1980s, the so-called lex
mercatoria developed by Continental arbitrators provided a legally
principled manner to treat multinational agreements with sovereign states in
the Middle East and Africa as if they were private contracts. 198 The
circumstances of the genesis were by then mostly obscured. Similarly, the
link of human rights law to the U.S. legal elite and palace wars within the
United States was especially apparent in the 1970s and early 1980s, when
human rights arguments were specifically used to challenge first the Nixon
and then the Reagan Administrations in favor of a more benevolent form of
U.S. hegemony. 199 At the end of the 1980s, however, international human
rights concerns were generally accepted as central to foreign relations.200
The framing of social and political interests and issues into the language
of law, mediated by academic intellectuals who translate non-legal
economic, political, and social problems into the law, and the movement in
one form or another of disputes into court-like forums, has an accumulated
impact.
Political conflicts between oil-producing countries and
multinational corporations accordingly shift into the subtleties of the lex
mercatoria. Arguments over the relationship between human rights and
national sovereignty replace political battles associated with the Cold War,
between competing empires, or claims for colonial independence. The
credibility and further evolution of the fields gave each of them some
distance from the political and economic fights that were embedded in
them.
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3. Diverging Paths
These two types of fields, however, once established and given a certain
level of credibility, then began to diverge. The international circulation of
ideas and approaches involves the movement of texts without the contexts
that give them their meaning. 201 When a particular legal technology moves
from one setting to another, how it becomes translated (or mistranslated)
depends on the structures of power and the positions of the translators who
deploy the technology. Similar mistranslations, we hypothesize, also occur
when there is movement from the national to a transnational level and even
from one symbolic field—for example, human rights or arbitration—to
another. Therefore, after the similar positions developed out of initial
shocks and periods of legal accumulation, each transnational field
necessarily developed in its own way. The different contexts and brokers at
play continued to shape each area.
Within the arbitration world, most of the brokers came from a more
informal network of arbitrators concentrated in Europe but covering much
of the globe—constituting what is often called the arbitration mafia.202
They served alternatively as lawyers and arbitrators in high stakes
transnational disputes. The relatively informal and small community at the
core could take advantage of many others who profited from investment in
the field. 203 Corporate law firms, for example, developed arbitration
expertise that enhanced their stake in the field.204 The knowledge and
essentials of arbitration practice could be taken off the shelf and applied to a
wide range of business disputes. The practice gained legitimacy and
developed some autonomy such that it could be transported to new places
and new types of disputes. It became simply “offshore justice,” even if the
courts were private and not public.205 Indeed, one of the leading arbitrators
in the generation that followed the pioneers even explained the evolution as
a matter of Weber’s “routinization of charisma.” 206 Repeat players came to
dominate the terrain.207 The routinizers became the “stars” of the next
generation of arbitrators.208 These characteristics allowed the field to grow
and prosper in new terrains along with economic and corporate law more
generally.
The field of arbitration evolved through the gradual extension of the field
into new markets in terms of types of disputes and geographical reach.
International commercial arbitration facilitated the relatively easy
conversion of various forms of capital into arbitration, making for a
201. See Pierre Bourdieu, Les Conditions Sociales de la Circulation Internationale des
Idées, 145 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 3, 4 (2002).
202. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 34–38.
203. See id. at 51–58.
204. See id. at 51–54.
205. Id. at 58.
206. Id. at 37.
207. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974).
208. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 15, at 40.
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relatively smooth expansion from North-South disputes to transnational
contracts generally, and to new markets, such as Latin America, which had
once been hostile to international arbitration. 209 Each expansion brought
new capital and subtle adjustments in the doctrine and approaches, while at
the same time reinforcing the value of the core of the field. In particular,
high barriers to entry to become an arbitrator allowed the gradual
cooptation of national legal notables who could provide the credibility
necessary to gain the support of the national court systems. 210 The local
notables in turn invested in the legal capital connected to international
commercial arbitration as a condition of entry, 211 again reinforcing the core
while extending the field to new terrains.
This relatively strong entrenchment of international commercial
arbitration comes not through any single transnational institutional structure
but rather through a multiplicity of forums following the same business
model. It is a strength that comes from weak links, with a highly flexible
set of institutions that structure an internationalized market of legal
expertise. That market allows national legal notables to accumulate or
diversify their own portfolios by exchanging their respective forms of
national capital. The local impact is therefore relatively limited. There is a
spillover into national settings, but it is segmented in a way similar to the
former colonial courts of Shanghai or Cairo. 212 It is a Western justice—offshore “litigociation” handled by corporate law firms—with only a few local
characteristics.
The area of trade provides a similar example. As Gregory Shaffer,
Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, and Barbara Rosenberg show, Brazil found
ways to push the WTO to accommodate its trade agenda against the
Western developed world, thereby opening up the field somewhat. 213 As a
result, the politics of the South put the fairness of the trade regime on the
agenda. 214 But Brazil’s actions also involved a commitment to work within
the prevailing WTO regime, which brought increased legitimacy to the core
of the field. The gradual move outside the core, as in the case of
international commercial arbitration, enhanced the legitimacy of the core.
The process of bringing Brazil in, for example, meant that when the stakes
were highest, the Brazilian players would take their claims to the law firms
and expertise tied to the center in Washington, D.C. Again, the Brazil
experience suggests the same pattern of national notables participating
locally in a relatively discrete part of well-entrenched Western justice.
209. See id. at 283–91.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Id. at 231–35; see also Lee, supra note 17, at 1375–1414.
213. See Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, & Barbara Rosenberg, The
Transnational Meets the National: The Construction of Trade Policy Networks in Brazil, in
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 170, 180–84.
214. See generally Chiedu Osakwe, Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Rules:
Dynamic Transformations in Trade Policy Behavior and Performance, 20 MINN. J. INTL L.
365 (2011) (detailing the changing agenda of the WTO in relation to assertions of power by
Brazil and others).
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In other areas of economic law, we see evidence of a similar
phenomenon.
Economic law may occasionally be politicized and
transformed, such as when the steady expansion of U.S.-style intellectual
property law was challenged and rerouted in response to the AIDS
epidemic, the high prices that drug companies sought to charge, and
political changes in the United States that made the government more
sympathetic to those seeking AIDS medications. The general story,
however, is of a gradual expansion under the radar involving corporate law
firms and national players joining in the spread of a set of transnational
practices and a business model that goes with it.215
The field of human rights, by contrast, could not really follow a
specifically legal evolution. The initial mix was an unstable alliance of
political activists, media entrepreneurs, and academic idealists. The
political issues connected to human rights were often front page news, and
the institutions created to handle them, such as Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals, were not easily
separated from the contexts that produced them. 216 Those who constructed
these institutions tended to be lawyer-diplomats who continued to use them
as part of diplomacy. For instance, questions of who would be prosecuted
for what crimes were closely connected to substantial issues of realpolitik.
Julian Seroussi, for example, documents the contested politics within the
human rights community about who ought to be prosecuted after the
Pinochet case opened up the potential for so-called universal jurisdiction.217
The public visibility translated into relatively few cases, and the institutions
created remained fragile and lacking in legitimacy.
In contrast to international commercial arbitration, political actors could
force quick changes in the terms of engagement in the field of human
rights. A relatively early example was the apparent decision of the Pinochet
government and the generals in Argentina to use the brutal tactic of
disappearances—instead of explicitly taking political prisoners—to avoid
the spotlight that Amnesty International brought to prisoners of
conscience. 218 A more recent example of such a phenomenon, mass
executions to avoid witnesses that might sustain a court prosecution, took
place in the Sri Lankan purge of the Tamil rebels. 219 The shifting context
from the Cold War and decolonization to ethnic genocides and civil wars
made it hard to develop repeat players. The only real continuity was in the
academic elaboration of legal principles. But even if legal debates and legal
215. See Diana Rodriguez Franco, Globalizing Intellectual Property Rights: The Politics
of Law and Public Health, in TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 139, 160–61.
216. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS
PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS (2011) (detailing the evolution of human
rights prosecutions and their relationship to politics).
217. Julien Seroussi, The Cause of Universal Jurisdiction: The Rise and Fall of an
International Mobilization, in TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 48, 57–58.
218. We cannot document this statement, but the timing and conduct are consistent with
this theory.
219. See Jon Lee Anderson, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over Its Tamil
Insurgents, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41.

2338

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

doctrines of human rights reoccur often in the field, in practice they are
reinvented and reconfigured in relatively short time intervals for battle in
new political contexts.
We see some of this dynamic in the three generations of human rights
NGOs that we have described elsewhere. 220 The ICJ, as mentioned above,
was very much a product of the Cold War. 221 Amnesty International, the
major embodiment of the second generation, sought to find neutrality by
limiting its activities initially to prisoners of conscience found in the various
camps of the Cold War. 222 The third generation, epitomized by Human
Rights Watch, returned the focus to domestic politics and reflected a close
relationship between U.S. foreign policy and NGO activities. 223 Initially
focused instrumentally on the Reagan Administration, the goal was to
influence the United States to implement policies that drew on the expertise
and approach of Human Rights Watch (and the scholars and political and
In many respects, the
social entrepreneurs associated with it). 224
culmination of this strategy was the Balkan War, pursued by the Clinton
Administration on the grounds that human rights violations had occurred.225
The agenda of NGOs has shifted dramatically according to domestic
political concerns such as the War on Terror.226 There is a new generation,
in fact, exemplified by International Alert, that focuses on conflict
resolution and peacekeeping. 227 It is therefore not a matter of extending the
field gradually to new arenas and places. The field jumps around in relation
to highly visible politics. There is a strong contrast, in short, between the
high symbolic value of human rights principles and doctrines and the
limited autonomy of the legal practices associated with this sphere, which
are politicized, segmented, and discontinuous.
Not only are there strong divergences between the economic side and the
political side, but there is also very little spillover between the two
subfields. As we have seen, they have different structures and diverging
dynamics. To be sure, national elites have increasingly invested their
resources—whether professional, political, or learned—into international
legal practice and transnational quasi-judicial institutions on the human
rights side. The proliferation of human rights courts, however, even
involving prominent symbolic investments with high visibility in symbolic
discourses, has not led to any significant impact on national legal practices.
The transnational political and human rights subfield, in fact, facilitates a
220. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 19, at 62–72, 131–34.
221. See id. at 62–64.
222. See id. at 70–72.
223. See id. at 131–32.
224. See id.
225. Dezalay & Garth, supra note 159, at 252–53.
226. See generally SANDS, supra note 6 (exemplifying the shift in concern of activists
toward U.S. behavior with respect to human rights).
227. See Sara Dezalay, Lawyering War or Talking Peace: On Militant Usages of the Law
in the Resolution of Internal Armed Conflicts: A Case Study of International Alert, in
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 60, 74–80; Sandrine Lefranc, From PeaceBuilding in War-Torn Countries to Justice in the Global North, in TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE,
supra note 40, at 84, 93–101.
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kind of reverse spillover from the South to the North. The imported
expertise of human rights and peacekeeping is structured around
transnational NGOs funded from the North and embedded in hegemonic
politics. The Save Darfur coalition is one of many such examples of an
entity that arises very much out of politics in the North and in particular the
United States. 228 The local roots in Africa are very meager. Such entities
serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the rule of law promoters within the
United States. Northern NGOs facilitate a kind of moral brain drain
exemplified by the earlier reconversion of Latin American human rights
pioneers into human rights professionals based in the North.
Indeed, the general failure of transitional justice as a catalyst for turning
ad hoc justice into reform of the courts reinforces the idea that the courts are
not adequate for transnationally oriented challenges such as human rights
violations. This sense of the courts’ failure builds the credibility of forums
such as international commercial arbitration for transnational corporate
disputes. Instead of spillover from the corporate to the human rights side,
therefore, the problems in the human rights or political subfield contribute
to the autonomization of corporate transnational justice.
B. The Example of Europe
Before examining the transnational legal field more generally, it is
helpful to examine the relatively successful development of a transnational
legal field in Europe. The institutional “success” is that the ECJ and the
ECHR have both been successfully institutionalized and today serve a
complementary role in Europe. The ECJ is seen as the Supreme Court of
Europe and the cornerstone of Europe constructed as a state of law. 229 The
huge caseload of the ECHR has become routinized, and the Court focuses
on reforming judicial procedures to enhance the rule of law. 230 The two
courts have also converged in recruitment with a heavy focus on academic
capital. 231 Yet we must also recognize that Europe shares many of the
structural features detailed in the above examination of the transnational
legal field. Europe provides one channel for the internationalization of
national legal fields, and some of the issues we see in Europe also arise with
respect to the transnational legal field.
After World War II, the project of rebuilding Europe was part and parcel
of the attempt to contain the spread of communism. 232 The dynamic
between the United States and European countries at that time brought a set
228. See, e.g., About Us, SAVE DARFUR, http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/about (follow
hyperlinks “Organizational Members” and “Unity Statement”) (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
229. See Cohen & Vauchez, supra note 190, at 417.
230. See Hodgson, supra note 189 (showing through comparative study the relative
activism of the ECHR); Mikael R. Madsen, Human Rights and the Hegemony of Ideology:
European Lawyers and the Cold War Battle over International Human Rights, in
TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 258, 271–72 (showing the process through which
the ECHR gained its prominent role).
231. See generally Cohen, supra note 137 (showing the differences in the early
recruitment).
232. See Madsen, supra note 230, at 258.
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of new European institutions—the beginnings of what became the European
Community (EC). 233 Again, crisis was an opportunity, as the beginning of
the Cold War set the initial stage for construction of a transnational legal
field. Law, as in the above examples, was initially at the margins of the
main events. Nevertheless, cosmopolitan lawyer intermediaries who were
well connected to prominent counterparts in the United States, such as
George Ball, were central to the process of seeking to organize Europe.234
As Antonin Cohen points out, the activities of “a small set of multipositioned politico-legal entrepreneurs” planted seeds for later
developments by making sure that each of the two major European
organizations, the predecessors to the European Community on one side,
and the Council of Europe on the other, were provided with courts. 235 The
two courts, the ECJ and the ECHR, contributed very little at the outset to
the European project.236 This very limited role, moreover, was consistent
with the expectations of those who created the courts.
The key actors in building a European legal field were, as shown by
Antoine Vauchez, an early transnational legal network located at the
crossroads between the national and the European levels. 237 This group
took advantage of early EC investment aimed toward facilitating the
development of European scholarly knowledge beyond national legal
literature. 238 One indicator of the success of this investment is that the
various Jean Monnet projects focused on European law now bring together
1,500 professors and approximately 500,000 students every year. There are
also specifically European legal specialties and even a couple of academic
institutions, namely the College of Europe in Bruges and the European
University Institute in Florence.239 In addition, the actors built their
network of European professionals through a diplomatic logic that took
advantage of the fact that judges were appointed by nation states with parity
among the key countries. Cases were argued in the language of the
defending party, 240 which limited competition and promoted within each
country a small European bar with appropriate expertise and linguistic
abilities, and with an interest in the academic promotion of European law.
The group thus blurred the differences in legal status at the national levels.
One particular EU-subsidized academic and professional group, the
Fédération internationale pour le droit européen (FIDE),

233. See id.
234. See JAMES A. BILL, GEORGE BALL: BEHIND THE SCENES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
101–35 (1997).
235. Cohen, supra note 137, at 242.
236. See Vauchez, supra note 190, at 7.
237. See generally Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in
the Government of Europe, in TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 219.
238. See id. at 225–29.
239. Id. at 228.
240. See 1 D.G. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 46–
47 (1965); Antoine Vauchez, Une Élite d’intermédiaires: Genèse d’un Capital Juridique
Européen, 166 ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 54, 57–61 (2007).
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spearheaded the efforts to define a rationality that would make
sense of the set of EC institutions built in the Paris and Rome
treaties, one that would be distinguishable from that of national
political systems and yet, at the same time, autonomous from the
other European arenas (economic, bureaucratic, etc).241
They drew on their domestic legal expertise and capital and on models
from abroad, especially from the United States, to build and legitimate
something European. 242 They were able to take advantage of a perceived
crisis of the EC late in the 1950s to transform the position of the ECJ.243
The famous cases of the early 1960s were designed to take advantage of
this growing network of Europrofessionals. There was a very close
relationship between the European scholarship emanating from FIDE, the
judges and advocate generals of the ECJ, and the lawyers who staged,
decided, interpreted, and celebrated the two key ECJ cases: Van Gend en
Loos, 244 decided in 1962, and Costa v. ENEL, 245 decided in 1964.246 The
ECJ’s pathbreaking legal rhetoric was carefully mixed with unobtrusive
judicial results in the particular cases.247 The cases then became the
material for the elaboration of an ambitious constitution for Europe, and a
new role and agenda for the ECJ as a kind of constitutional court.
The story of the ECHR proceeds differently, but again reveals the
dramatic shift from origins to institutionalization. Madsen documents the
very weak initial role of the ECHR in addressing human rights violations
within Europe and the orientation of the Council of Europe as an instrument
of the Cold War carefully constructed to avoid issues connected to
European colonies. 248 In Madsen’s terms,
The main objective of the European Convention of 1950 was,
therefore, not the development of a detailed European
jurisprudence that should substantially alter national traditions of
human rights, but instead producing a document that confined the
area of Free Europe; that is, the [European] Convention was an
early form of containment politics.249
Early cases, however, challenged the policing approaches used to
maintain colonial relationships, building the role of the court even if the
court carefully refrained at the outset from any direct challenge to colonial
activities.250 Expanding on the early cases, the ECHR in the late 1970s
both participated in and took advantage of the emerging global human
241. Vauchez, supra note 237, at 222.
242. Id. at 228.
243. Cohen, supra note 137, at 243–44.
244. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen 1963
E.C.R. 1.
245. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
246. Vauchez, supra note 190, at 9–26.
247. See id. at 13.
248. See Madsen, supra note 230, at 262–68.
249. Id. at 269.
250. See id. at 265–68.
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rights movement. 251 It became a kind of Supreme Court reviewing the
human rights policies of individual European countries. The court became
solidly institutionalized. Again, the agenda dramatically changed from the
period of the establishment of the court, leading the ECHR in the individual
rights sphere to a position parallel to the ECJ in the economic sphere.
The two courts—and indeed the organizations to which they belonged—
were initially quite different. The judges of the two courts, for example,
originally came from very different backgrounds. 252 But the strong
differences in career paths of those appointed to each court have diminished
recently, which is an indicator of competition and reciprocal influence.
Indeed, the courts now overlap much more in the issues they examine,
complementing each other while building a more unified European legal
field—fueled also by the continued flourishing of European academic
programs and scholarship inside and outside of Europe (which has, of
course, also expanded to the East). In this manner, both sides of the
European legal field show signs of coming together more explicitly.
Advocates comfortable within the European legal field can begin to engage
in forum shopping in order to advance their interests, further developing the
field as a whole.
This relatively successful transnational development, however, has not
had a major impact at the national level. Few judges and European
practitioners return to national judiciaries. 253 The clerks of the ECJ and the
lawyers of the European Commission are mainly recruited by national law
firms of the multinational firms centered in London.254 More generally,
training and experience in European legal practice tends to provide a
stepping stone from national legal fields toward more international—
including transatlantic—positions. 255 The analysis suggests, therefore, that
the supranational field is still relatively weak in the sense that it serves
mainly as a crossroad between national legal fields where legal expertise is
accumulated and valorized. The actual law schools, for example, are
national despite the existence of European legal departments in Bruges and
Florence. 256 Still, there has been a slow process of the valorization of
European (and international) legal expertise as a legitimate resource in
national careers, even if still not sufficient to provide access to top positions
in the judiciary or among the elite of the bar.257 And within Europe, there
remains a pronounced division between the elite of the corporate bar and
human rights circles. 258
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C. The Changing Market for Legal Education
The market for legal education provides a potential forum to bring
together different sides at national and transnational levels. Potentially, the
children of top business executives can connect with the children of the
clergy; old money can connect with new money and emerging social
groups; moral entrepreneurs can link with profit maximizers; and local
know-who can connect with imported know-how. The law faculty in many
countries of the world is a melting pot to produce what Bourdieu termed the
degree of the bourgeoisie. 259 It is the place where, historically, the old elite
represented by the aristocracy and feudalism could be converted into the
advisers and conflict managers for emerging states and multinational
enterprises. Those who brought social capital, as noted by Ralf Dahrendorf
about Germany, 260 might specialize in social skills such as drinking and
dueling, while those lacking social endowments could over-invest in
learning and the production of law, making for a division of labor bringing
legitimacy and stature to the profession.
There is no question that there is an emerging global competition in legal
education. 261 New or substantially reformed law schools in many parts of
the world—including India with first the National Law Schools and now the
Jindal Global Law School; South Korea and Japan with the shift from
undergraduate legal instruction toward U.S.-style law schools; and the FGV
Law School in Brazil’s globalized program—are seeking to gain stature as
global law schools. 262 The implications of these developments merit
further study, but at present the competition is still dominated by the elite
U.S. law schools, which provide the only common breeding ground for
corporate lawyers, European politico-legal entrepreneurs, and a small
number of NGO activists who export agendas shaped by U.S. hegemonic
politics, such as Darfur and the field of transitional justice (aided by
European funding). 263
CONCLUSION: SPILLOVER AND LEGITIMACY
The basic question of this Article is the possibility of spillover in the
creation of legitimacy—the conversion of social capital into legal capital
and the corresponding transfer of legitimacy from one sector of legal
practice to another. At the national level, focusing on Asian examples, we
259. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE FIELD OF POWER
300–35 (1998).
260. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Law Faculties and the German Upper Class, in SOCIOLOGY OF
LAW 294, 294–309 (Vilhelm Aubert ed., 1969).
261. John Flood, Legal Education in the Global Context: Challenges from Globalization,
Technology, and Changes in Government Regulation, LEGAL SERVICES BOARD 1 (Oct. 12,
2011), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/news_publications/latest_news/pdf/lsb_legal_
education_report_flood.pdf (“From an empirical point of view there is an inexorable move in
the world towards the Americanization of legal education, in the form of the widespread
adoption of the JD degree over the LLB.”).
262. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and Legitimating Two Sides of
Transnational Justice, in TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 277, 293.
263. Id.
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observed that the conversion process of social into legal capital has so far
been relatively limited in China, which means a relatively limited spillover
from the small corporate bar into an enhanced role of lawyers in the field of
political power. 264 Similarly, experiments in legal aid or clinical education
have not in the short term served as Trojan horses to get lawyers a stronger
position in state governance. There are examples of such crossovers in
Asia, however. In particular, lawyer-brokers took advantage of the
changing political situation in South Korea, and they built on the small and
elite profession, which was a legacy of Japanese colonialism. 265 Similarly,
Indonesia provides a particularly good example of the kind of process that
is evident in South Korea 266: A corporate bar moves out of a relatively
isolated and foreign-oriented enclave into a broader role in the state and in
the national economy.
Such relative successes provide the bases for strengthening the role of
law more generally in the economy and the state. The process is never
simple, however. Law is a symbolic good. As such, it must be legitimated
before it can successfully be exploited. Legitimation comes when there is a
collective belief that legal authority will provide something of value to the
holders of economic and political power. It may take a generation or more
of work by lawyers and institutions before the (re)production of legal
knowledge is in a position to offer legitimacy to the holders of economic
and political power, and for there to be sufficient distance to make that offer
credible. Within the United States, over a long period of time and as a
result of a very specific history, corporate lawyers in conjunction with law
schools and philanthropic organizations succeeded in becoming the
essential experts according to rules that they shaped, which allowed their
clients to thrive under an umbrella of legal legitimacy. It is no surprise that
the era of U.S. hegemony brings efforts to reproduce at the transnational
level something akin to that which made elite lawyers thrive in the United
States.
The complex development of legal Europe provides an example of the
interplay of courts, legal education, corporate law firms, and U.S.-generated
expertise. The result of legal entrepreneurship taking advantage of its
national capital and external situations—the Cold War and the related rise
of the international human rights movement, for example—succeeded in
giving a role to law, lawyers, and courts far beyond what the founders of
the various European institutions envisioned. But the relative success in
bridging two sides in Europe has also been consistent with the relative
weakness of the European legal field in comparison to the national legal
fields.
There is no inevitability to the overcoming of the divide between the
political and the economic sides of transnational justice, and the credibility
of one or both sides could erode quickly—as has happened many times in
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domestic settings. Too close or transparent connections between elite
lawyers and large financial interests or repressive politics, for example, can
derail the potential trajectory toward transnational justice that we have
described. Furthermore, as we noted at the outset, the kind of legitimate
hegemony that was the ideal of Warren Christopher and represented the
legacy of the foreign policy establishment in the United States is contested
in U.S. palace wars and potentially through rival hegemonies seeking to
shape the global rules of the game. Lawyers are seeking to construct a field
of transnational justice and to take advantage of this field. They have
achieved some successes. Reforms in legal education may provide greater
opportunities to build on those successes and further bridge the divide
between the political side of transnational justice and the economic side.
But at present, there is a strong divide between the political and economic
sides of a transnational legal field, potentially threatening the legitimacy of
both sides.

